In 2006, U.S. Homeland Security's (DHS) Department of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ran an internationally cooperative investigation into the purchase subscriptions of child pornography online, code-named Project Flicker. The Pentagon cases turned up during the 2006 ICE inquiry Project Flicker, which targeted overseas processing of child-porn payments. The global, collaborative investigation uncovered 30,000 child porn subscribers in 132 nations. As part of the probe, ICE investigators gained access to the names and credit card information of more than 5,200 Pentagon employees who had subscribed to websites offering images of child pornography. The course of the investigation found that these 5,200 civilian and military employees of the U.S. Defense Department — including some with the highest available security clearances — used credit cards or PayPal to specifically purchase subscriptions to sites with images of child pornography. Of those and to date, the Pentagon's Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) has investigated only a handful of the cases, according to the U.S. Defense Department's own records. To be crystal clear, U.S law designates that downloading child pornography is a federal crime, punishable by prison sentences of 5 to 20 years. Many of those individuals provided military email addresses or physical addresses with Army or fleet ZIP codes when they purchased the subscriptions. Which indicates that these military individuals made little effort to conceal their identities. It further implies by the sheer numbers involved, that there existed an atmosphere of acceptance and sanctioned protection.
DCIS cross-checked the ICE list against the Pentagon's military databases to come up with a list of Defense employees and contractors who appeared to be guilty of purchasing online subscriptions of child pornography. Names discovered included staffers for the Secretary of Defense, contractors for the National Security Agency (NSA), and a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). But the DCIS opened investigations into only 20 percent of the individuals identified, and succeeded in prosecuting just a handful. What it appears is that in the course of their ridiculously short 8-month long investigation, DCIS just ran the names in the databases to separate those in protected hierarchy from those who were judicially expendable, and sent on to prosecution a fraction of even that number. Kind of akin to what transpired in Nuremberg during the post-war Nazi show trials, where the 'wheat' was collected, protected and directed to Project Paperclip, Operations Sunshine, Matchbox and Bloodstone, while the chaff was prosecuted, imprisoned and executed.
Project Flicker investigative reports obtained by Yahoo's The Upshot blog, through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which you can read
here, show that DCIS investigators identified 264 Defense employees or contractors who had purchased child pornography online. Astonishingly, nine of those had "Top Secret Sensitive Compartmentalized Information" security clearances, meaning they had access to the nation's most sensitive secrets. All told, 76 of the individuals had Secret or higher clearances. But DCIS investigated only 52 of the suspects, and just 10 were ever charged with viewing or purchasing subscriptions to child pornography. Without greater public disclosure of how these cases wound down, it's impossible to know how or whether any of the names listed in the Project Flicker papers came in for additional scrutiny. It's conceivable that some of them were picked up by local law enforcement, but it seems likely that most of the people flagged by the investigation did not have their military careers disrupted in the context of the DCIS inquiry. Broken down, those identified had the following security clearances:
• 9 possessed Top Secret Sensitive Compartmentalized Information.
• 13 carried Top Secret security clearance.
• 8 had NATO Secret security clearance.
• 42 possessed Secret security clearance.
• 4 carried Interim Secret security clearance.
Among those charged were Gary Douglass Grant, a captain in the Army Reserves and a Judge Advocate General, or military prosecutor. After investigators executing a search warrant found child pornography on his computer, he pleaded guilty last year to state charges of possession of obscene matter of a minor in a sexual act in California. Others charged included contractors for the NSA with Top Secret clearances; one of them -- a former contractor -- fled the country after being indicted and is believed to be in Libya.
But the vast majority of those investigated, including an active-duty Lieutenant Colonel in the Army (associate of Michael Acquino perhaps?), and an official in the office of the Secretary of Defense, were never charged. On top of that, 212 people on ICE's list were never investigated at all. Perhaps this explains why… in a November 19, 2010 letter from Pentagon inspector General George S. Heddel to Senator Charles Grassley, of Iowa, Haddel stated that child pornography was “not one of DCIS’ investigative priorities’’. I guess chasing down false-flag synthetic terrorists, setting up patsies and surveilling the local citizenry occupies the majority of their time.
More revealing is that DCIS documents secured through Yahoo's blog The Upshot's FOIA request point out that the common summation found in their files was: "Due to DCIS headquarters' direction and other DCIS investigative priorities, this investigation is cancelled". More telling is the fact that it's now 4 years later and NOTHING is being done. Reports from Pentagon investigators obtained by the Boston Globe in the summer of 2010, said many of the 300 known cases at the time were not pursued because the agency claimed it did not have adequate resources. In others, they stated, there was insufficient evidence for prosecution. For example, in child pornography cases, the victims depicted in the images need to be positively identified as minors by law enforcement officials for charges to be brought. To compound matters, criminal proceedings against those listed was also allowed to lapse due to statute of limitations that have been conveniently allowed to expire.
What does this all mean? Well, for one, pornography, rape, murder and prostitution of children flourishes virtually unhampered internationally, at high-levels of government, military, religious institutions and corporate business. It also exists in various depraved forms throughout society-at-large, however that is not the specific focus of this blog post for now. The protected operations by and large are never investigated, nor exposed until stumbled upon when one of their filthy band or low-level procurers do get caught. Then the judicial auto-protection machine rolls into high gear to contain and ensure that compartmentalised operations are not sussed, remaining operational and untouched. Law-enforcement from on-high orders investigations closed or constrained to low-level operators, and then further winnowed down to a single "lone-patsy", e.g. a Marc Dutroux type. Once a sacrificial patsy has been selected they are then prosecuted quickly, to avoid a lengthy, problematic trial that could possibly expose dirty bits of business, involvement from on high, and possibly reveal the full scope of the criminal enterprise. During the police investigation all evidence and witnesses are carefully screened and sanitised, by strategically placed prosecutorial insiders who never allow certain evidence or incriminating witness testimony to be introduced. At the subsequent trial's conclusion, any and all related evidence is either sealed immediately and/or ordered destroyed to secure it from dedicated investigators who might discover evidence that was suppressed. Main-stream media coverage is censored, and is either absent, or sanitised/satanised to reflect only scripted, official propaganda releases. One main thing I noticed in researching this case, was the subtly deceptive use of the words "purchase" or "purchased" when describing the child porn acquisition activities of the military connected suspects. When the evidence clearly showed that these were
subscriptions to specific child pornography sites, within this post I've made the changes to reflect this reality. You see, 'purchasing' implies simple one-off acquisitions, whereas the reality of 'subscriptions' reveals regular, ongoing, longer-term use and access. You can see exactly why they'd want this downplayed through creative psycholinguistics.
The investigation and public exposure of these horrific crimes is a great thing to be sure. However, a trained investigator knows to examine all angles of evidence and data they are scrutinising. When matched against consistency, not everything that appears at face value is what it is. While the masses gain from this knowledge, there are other parties that gain substantially more, and at some level of this combined investigation which included multiple law-enforcement agencies from the United States, Canada, England, Italy, Belarus, Ukraine, Australia, and other countries, plus Interpol and Europol, you can best bet that Israeli intelligence was involved. Considering that Project Flicker was run through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ICE department, and DHS is a known proxy for Israeli intelligence, so their hand in this is most assured. Not to assist mind you, but to gain information to warn their child pornography fronts and to get their hands on the list of names of the 30,000 child pornography subscribers in 132 nations. Especially the 5,200 names in the U.S. military, which to the MOSSAD and the other covert Israeli intel agencies, is better than gold coated with platinum.
You see in the world of intelligence, nothing is a better blackmail material than an individual connected to child sexual assault, whether they be customer, producer or perpetrator; it secures co-operative behaviour better than drugs, money, lascivious activity with adults (agents, assets or hired prostitutes) or any other extortion. It is also not uncommon for intelligence to plant this type of evidence either digitally or physically on a directed target to achieve the same effects. With the list of names secured in Project Flicker through deception or electronic espionage, it's simple one-stop shopping. Every one named of strategic intelligence value can now be compromised and exploited to the advantage and promotion of Israel's and the Zionist agenda. Often, intelligence runs ops of their own, or uses criminal asset fronts involved in these activities as honey-pots. These honey-pot purveyors attract and lure in their sick clientele, where their activities and subscription purchases are logged and recorded for future intel use.
One 11-member child pornography ring was arrested in 2008 by Belarus law-enforcement. In January of 2010 five more connected to this ring were arrested by Ukranian police officials in Belarus. The ring used a variety of online and traditional payment methods, elaborate protection measures and a franchise business model one Interpol agent compared to a fast-food chain to make millions of dollars providing 10,000 Americans and 20,000 others across the globe access to images and videos of sexually exploited boys and girls, some reportedly as young as 3 years old, and some toddlers in diapers.
Among the United States child-porn buyers identified by the investigation were doctors, police officers, sheriff's deputies, school teachers, attorneys and preachers. Also snared were Department of Defense personnel or contractors, including several with top-secret security clearances. On Sept. 15, 2010, Pentagon officials with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) announced that they were reopening their child porn investigation into 264 Defense Department employees or contractors. They said the action was based on Project Flicker evidence.
The agents of Project Flicker revealed the workings of what they call the most significant child porn investigation in the Internet's history. The combined efforts shut down 230 websites with names like “Excited Angels” and “Boys Say Go”, and reportedly severely curtailed the number of commercial child pornography sites. Leads on the American buyers triggered more than 500 search warrants and at least 280 convictions involving ICE. Others were convicted by state or local authorities.
Where the pornography originated from, and who the young victims are, are unclear. Matt Dunn, Section Chief in the Child Exploitation Section of the ICE Cyber Crimes Center, said many of the images were recycled from LS and BD studios, giant Ukrainian producers of child pornography that were raided in 2004. In interviews, Dunn and other authorities, described the lucky breaks - and boneheaded choices by the criminals - that helped their investigation.
Though different sites provided images and videos focusing on different fetishes, they held many similarities. For one, they had a common design, payment method and price, ranging from $79.95 to $99.95 per month. Initially, subscribers at the assorted sites were steered to a common credit-card processing website. But that site was actually a sham. After purchasers provided personal detail and credit card information on this fake payment site, they were led to a PayPal account to make the real payments. The child porn ring got paid well - making somewhere between $5 million and $8 million from early 2006 until late 2007, according to Dunn. Very conveniently, details about the ring are sketchy. Aside from operating in Belarus, then in Ukraine, few details about the individuals or their affiliations to one another have been revealed.
Since 2006, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has seen a 50 percent reduction in commercial child pornography websites referred to its information clearinghouse, known as the CyberTipline, according to John Shehan, executive director for the organisation's Exploited Children Division. Though the internationally cooperative police effort has affected the commercial marketplaces, most of these images and videos are disseminated free by e-mail and peer-to-peer file sharing between individuals, who often belong to networked trust-based clubs.
Sources:
